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CASE NOTES 
Antitrust Law-SHERMAN ACT-STATE ACTION IMMUNITY- 
IMMUNITY DENIED TO STATE APPROVED UTILITY PRACTICE- 
Cantor u. Detroit Edison Co. ,  96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). 
The Detroit Edison Company (Edison), a privately owned 
electric utility regulated by the Michigan Public Service Com- 
mission (Commission), distributes electricity and light bulbs to 
about five million people in southeastern Michigan. Edison is 
required to file with the Commission its proposed tariff, com- 
posed of the rules, regulations, and rates for all electrical services 
it supp1ies.l When affirmatively approved by the Commission, 
the tariff becomes a Commission order; thereafter, any change or 
abandonment of the order without prior Commission approval 
would violate state law.2 Unlike the tariffs of other electric utili- 
ties regulated by the Commission, Edison's tariff includes a lamp 
exchange program by which Edison provides incandescent light 
bulbs to its residential customers a t  no additional ~ h a r g e . ~  How- 
l. The Commission is vested with "complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all 
public utilities" and to "regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions 
of service" and to "hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident 
to such regulation of public utilities, including electric light and power companies . . . ." 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 460.6 (Supp. 1976-77). Petitioner Cantor contended, however, 
that only Edison's "utility" activities are properly subject to Commission regulation. He 
argued that utility activities listed at id. § 460.501 (1967) include owning and operating 
"facilities for producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing . . . electricity 
. . . for the public for consumption," but do not cover light bulb distribution. Brief for 
Petitioner a t  12, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). 
2. The Court noted, however, that "there is no statute, Commission rule, or policy 
which would prevent [Edison] from abandoning the program merely by filing a new tariff 
providing for a proper adjustment in its rates . . . ." 96 S. Ct. a t  3114. For example, in 
1964 Edison eliminated the lamp exchange program from its tariff for commercial cus- 
tomer service, without a public hearing, through a concomitant rate reduction. Id. at 3113; 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t  33 n.9. 
3. See 96 S. Ct. at  3113-14. The lamp exchange program provides: 
Incandescent lamps will be furnished without extra charge: 
(1) To residents connected for the first time to the Company's lines, in 
such quantities as may be needed for all permanent fixtures. 
(2) As replacements of approved burned out lamps in proportion to the 
use of energy for lighting purposes under the applicable rate. 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t  6. The lamp exchange program was initiated in 1886 
by Edison's predecessor, the Detroit Illuminating Company, and has continued uninter- 
rupted for 90 years, with the Commission or its predecessor implicitly approving it as part 
of every tariff since 1916. 96 S. Ct. a t  3113. Brief for Respondent a t  4, Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). 
According to affidavits submitted in support of Edison's motion for summary judg- 
ment in federal district court, the original purpose of the program was to encourage the 
use of incandescent light bulbs to increase the use of electricity in homes, offices, and 
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ever, the cost of the service is incorporated in the residential 
electric service rate and is paid by customers whether or not they 
utilize the exchange program." 
In 1972, Lawrence Cantor, a retail drug store proprietor sell- 
ing light bulbs in Detroit, commenced an action in federal district 
court, charging that Edison's lamp exchange program constituted 
both a monopolization of the retail light bulb market in violation 
of section 2 of the Sherman Act5 and an illegal "tie-in" require- 
ment in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act.6 Cantor sought 
to enjoin Edison from effectively requiring the purchase of incan- 
descent light bulbs in connection with its sale of electricity and 
to recover treble damages. Granting Edison's motion for sum- 
mary judgment, the district court held that the Commission's 
affirmative approval of Edison's tariff and its continuing supervi- 
sion of Edison's activities constituted "state action" that is im- 
mune from the federal antitrust laws.' The Court of Appeals af- 
firmed? The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "neither 
Michigan's approval of the tariff. . . nor the fact that the lamp 
exchange program may not be terminated until a new tariff is 
businesses serviced by the Detroit Illuminating Company. 96 S. Ct. a t  3114; Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 1, a t  4-5. Further, the lamp exchange service appears to have its 
origin in the Company's desire to compete against gas illuminating companies. Id. 
4. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t  4. 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section provides sanctions against "[elvery person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several states . . . ." 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). This section defines and prohibits "tie-in" requirements by 
providing that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . [to] make a 
sale . . . of goods . . . or fix a price charged therefor . . . on the condition . . . 
that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a 
competitor . . . where the effect of such . . . condition . . . may be to substan- 
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 
7. 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (memorandum opinion). Stipulation 
was made in the district court that, for purposes of the summary judgment proceeding, 
the case be limited solely to the question of whether the state action exemption doctrine 
of Parker v. Brown, 317 U S .  341 (1943), applied to the Commission's approval of Edison's 
lamp exchange program. 96 S. Ct. a t  3113. The district court reasoned as follows: 
[TJhe question that must be decided in order to determine whether summary 
judgment lies is whether the . . . light bulb program can be characterized as 
state activity or private activity. If this light bulb program is in law state 
activity, summary judgment in favor of the defendant would be appropriate 
since in such instances the utility would be shielded from claimed antitrust 
violations. 
392 F. Supp. a t  1111. The Court accepted the rule that "when a state agency acts affirma- 
tively in approving rates and practices of a utility, there is no antitrust liability." Id. 
8. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) (summarily affirming district court opinion). 
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filed, is a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the 
federal antitrust laws . . . . 9 9 9  
A. The Sherman Act and State and Federal Exemptions 
Pursuant to its commerce clause powers,I0 Congress enacted 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890,11 which codified as federal 
law the economic policy that free competition should determine 
the production and distribution of goods and services in interstate 
commerce. The Act was also an "enactment of political econ- 
omy," its proponents seeking to "curb private concentrations of 
economic-and therefore political-power . " l2 Congress may cre- 
ate by statute express exemptions from the antitrust laws for 
federal regulatory schemes.13 If federal regulatory legislation con- 
tains no express exemption and is inconsistent with federal anti- 
trust policies, the courts must ascertain whether Congress in- 
tended to implicitly exempt the regulatory scheme from the anti- 
trust laws.I4 Generally, the Supreme Court does not favor exemp- 
-  - - - -  -- -- - 
9. 96 S. Ct. a t  3121. The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of 
the question whether the complaint alleged a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at 3123. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3. See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust 
Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972). 
11. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at  15 U.S.C. §§  1-7 (1970)). 
12. First, Private Interest and Public Control: Government Action, The FirstAmend- 
ment, and the Sherman Act, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 9, 44. During the congressional debates 
concerning the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman commented: 
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and 
among them none is more threatening than the inequality of condition, of 
wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the 
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade 
and to break down competition. 
21 CONG. k c .  2460 (1890). He also warned that "[ilf the concentrated powers of this 
combination [industrial trusts] are intrusted to a single man, it  is a kingly prerogative, 
inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to strong resistance of 
the State and national authorities." Id. at  2457. 
13. See generally J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 78-84 (1976); 
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 
Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974). For a complete list of statutory exemptions from the antitrust 
laws as of 1960, see Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTI- 
TRUST L.J. 313, 330-54 (1961). 
It  has been explained that "[tlhe Supreme Court . . . has no control over federal 
statutory exemptions and is bound to enforce them regardless of whether they serve the 
public interest or were designed only to aid narrow special interest groups." Slater, supra, 
at  80 (footnotes omited). 
14. See Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State Action 
Exemptions, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 287,291 (1973). In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret 
the substance of the Sherman Act, the Act was read broadly to prohibit a rate-fixjng 
9121 CASE NOTES 915 
tions and is reluctant to find an implied "repeal" of the antitrust 
laws.I5 Only in cases where the federal regulatory scheme is so 
pervasive that it  is clearly repugnant to the antitrust laws will the 
Court find an implied repeal, and then only to the extent neces- 
sary. l6 
State authority to substitute regulatory schemes for certain 
areas of competition has traditionally been upheld.17 Congress 
may, however, exercise its commerce clause powers to limit or 
even proscribe certain state regulatory action.18 Since only com- 
merce within the ambit of the commerce clause is subject to the 
Sherman Act's prohibitions,l"he scope of the commerce clause 
determines the reach of federal antitrust laws. 
In 1890, the commerce clause was given a fairly narrow inter- 
pretation and extended only to actual interstate buying, selling, 
and transportation incident thereto.20 As a result, even though the 
agreement among 18 railroads, even though the agreement had been filed with the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission. Id. a t  314-15. The Court emphasized the congressional 
intent to end restraints of trade no matter what their source. Id. a t  340-41; see First, supra 
note 12, at 15-18. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 
(1975); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361,368 (1967); Carnation Co. v. 
Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213,217-18 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia 
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 
357 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). 
16. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 683-86 (1975); Otter 
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-74, 391 (1973); Silver v. New York 
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,357 (1963); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 
334, 350-51 (1959); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945). In Georgia 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., the Court stated that "[rlegulated industries are not per se exempt 
from the Sherman Act. . . . Only a clear repugnancy between the old law [Sherman Act] 
and the new [regulatory scheme] results in the former giving way and then only pro tanto 
to the extent of the repugnancy." Id. 
17. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876), the Court upheld a state's authority 
to supplant competition with regulation in an area of the economy "affected with a public 
interest" and noted that 
it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country 
from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bak- 
ers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of 
charge to be made for services rendered, accomodations furnished, and articles 
sold. 
See Handler, supra note 10, a t  6-7. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, !l 2. 
19 See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 & n.2 
(1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974); United States v. 
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945). 
20. See Slater, supra note 13, a t  84-85. Given this narrow interpretation it  is unlikely 
that Congress really considered a t  all whether a state's regulation of its public utilities 
was to be within the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. a t  84. One scholar has noted, never- 
theless, that 
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Sherman Act was interpreted quite broadly to strike down inter- 
state activity permitted by state law,21 it was not a major tool for 
controlling predominantly intrastate economic activity.22 Within 
a few decades, however, purely intrastate activities could be regu- 
lated under the commerce clause if they had the requisite impact 
on interstate commerce.23 A concomitant expansion of state eco- 
nomic regulation soon precipitated the question of what result 
would obtain when the expanding ambit of the Sherman Act 
brings it into conflict with inconsistent state regulatory law. 
B. The Parker Doctrine 
Although earlier cases had rejected Sherman Act challenges 
[b]y 1889, the Supreme Court had been called upon to decide the validity of 
state or local regulation of rates in or entry into the lighting, water, and railroad 
industries. Thus, by 1890 the public utilities field was, in fact, "one of the few 
important areas of economic life" where government action had moved beyond 
the bounds of laissez faire. 
First, supra note 12, a t  I 3  (footnotes omitted). It has been argued that "a full reading of 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act is not likely to help answer . . . [wlhether 
actions taken pursuant to the power of a state were to be included or excluded from the 
Sherman Act . . . ." Slater, supra note 13, a t  83. For other discussions concerning the 
legislative intent of the Sherman Act as it relates to state regulatory schemes, see First, 
supra note 12, a t  13 n.38; Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Governmental 
Action, 48 TUL. L. REV. 272,277 n.39 (1974); Comment, Participant Governmental Action 
Immunity From the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 474, 482-84 (1972). 
21. In Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), the Court rejected 
the argument that defendants' compliance with New Jersey's liberal incorporation laws 
in forming a holding company would shield from antitrust attack the consolidation of 
Hill's Great Northern Railway Company with Morgan's Northern Pacific Railway Com- 
pany. Justice Harlan declared that under the supremacy clause "no state can endow any 
of its corporations . . . with authority to restrain interstate or international commerce, 
or to disobey the national will as manifested in legal enactments of Congress." Id. at  350. 
22. In the early 1900's, however, the Court did employ an equal protection or substan- 
tive due process analysis to supervise and often invalidate certain state anticompetitive 
regulatory programs. Later, as numerous state and federal regulatory schemes were con- 
sidered fair and necessary to extricate the country from the Great Depression, the Court 
largely abandoned economic interventionism in favor of judicial restraint or a "hands-off' 
policy. See Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v.  State Anticompetitive Regulation: A Means 
Scrutiny Limit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 179, 180-82. See generally Hether- 
ington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 13 (1958); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhuma- 
tion and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34,36-40; Note, Counterrevolution in State Consti- 
tutional Law, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1963). 
23. Slater, supra note 13, a t  85. See, e-g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 605 
(1939); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago B. & O.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922). In 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Supreme Court ruled that as long 
as the state regulated events within its own borders, other than transportation heading 
for an out-of-state destination, the federal government probably lacked authority to regu- 
late these same events. However, E.C. Knight was explicitly disavowed in Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948), decided only 
a few years after Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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to restraints on competition involving state  sovereign^,^^ Parker 
v.  BrownZI is the case most frequently cited for the proposition 
that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate private practices 
and not to prohibit a state from imposing a restraint on trade as 
an act of government." In Parker the Court considered whether 
the California Agricultural Prorate Act (Prorate Act) was ren- 
dered invalid by the Sherman Act. Enacted as an antidepression 
measure, the Prorate Act was aimed at curing the chronic over- 
supply of agricultural commodities produced in California and 
preventing the economic waste resulting from competitive mar- 
keting. The Prorate Act authorized a state commission to enforce 
collective marketing programs designed to restrict competition 
among agricultural producers and maintain prices in the distri- 
bution of their commodities to packers. 
Porter Brown, a producer and packer of raisins, brought suit 
to enjoin Parker, the Director of Agriculture, from enforcing the 
proration program operative in the raisin industry. A three-judge 
federal district court held that the program constituted an undue 
burden on interstate commerce and enjoined its enforcement. On 
direct appeal, the Supreme Court requested both parties to brief 
and argue the issue of "whether the state statute involved is 
rendered invalid by the . . . Sherman Assuming arguendo 
that the proration program would have been illegal if established 
by private parties, the Court held that the Sherman Act was 
inapplicable to the state proration program since Congress did 
not intend to restrain "state action" or "official action directed 
by a state" when undertaken "in the execution of a governmental 
Articulating its overriding desire to show deference to 
24. In 1895, the first antitrust attack upon state actiion was repulsed in Lowenstein 
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.S.C. 1895), in which the circuit court held that a South Carolina 
board having monopoly authority in the purchase and sale of liquor could not be sued 
under the Sherman Act since the state was neither a corporation nor a person. Id. at  911. 
In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), duly authorized harbor pilots, who were members 
of a state created regulatory board governing the licensing of pilots, sued to enjoin defen- 
dant from acting as a pilot without state authorization. Against defendant's claim that 
the state's restrictive regulatory scheme gave licensed pilots illegal monopoly powers, the 
Supreme Court held that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from 
the fact that duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties 
devolving upon them by law." Id. at  345. 
25. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
26. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975). 
27. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3115 & 11.16 (1976). 
28. 317 U.S. at 350-52. Noting that Congress could, if i t  desired, constitutionally 
prohibit a state from mandating a stabilization program, the Court declared: 
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which 
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state sovereigns, the Court ruled that "[iln a dual system of 
government . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's con- 
trol over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to 
Congress."' The Court warned, however, that "a state does not 
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authoriz- 
ing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is law- 
f ~ l . " ~ "  It also noted that it was not deciding the applicability of 
the Sherman Act where "the state or its municipality [becomes] 
a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for 
restraint of trade. "31 
From Parker emerged the concept that the Sherman Act does 
not prohibit "state action,"32 although the Court did not espouse 
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from 
activities directed by its legislature. 
. . . .  
. . .[I]t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the 
program and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a gov- 
ernmental policy. . . . 
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract 
or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish 
a monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government 
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
29. Id. at 351. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at  351-52. 
32. The term "state action" is used interchangeably with "Parker immunity," 
"Parker exemption," "immunity," and "exemption" (unless qualified as "implied federal 
exemption"). Some writers believe that the concepts of immunity and exemption should 
be differentiated to facilitate analysis, rather than used interchangeably as is done by 
some courts and commentators. See, e.g., Saveri, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws 
to Public Bodies, 4. U.S.F.L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1970); Slater, supra note 13, a t  71 n.4; 
Tepley, supra note 20, a t  280 n.54; Comment, supra note 20, at 476. "'Immunity' implies 
that a subject has never been encompassed by a rule of conduct; 'exemption' implies that 
a topic under regulation has been subsequently withdrawn from that regulation. . . ." Id. 
"State action" is also referred to as "government action," Slater, supra note 13, a t  71, 
and must be distinguished from Fourteenth Amendment "state action." One commenta- 
tor speaking of Parker "state action" has explained that "[tlhe term bears little relation 
to that used in the familiar fourteenth amendment context, and while its roots are ulti- 
mately traced to the eleventh amendment, most of the difficult questions will not be 
resolved by eleventh amendment analysis." Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Anti- 
trust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328,330-31 (1975). For a discus- 
sion of Fourteenth Amendment "state action," see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974); 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 867 (1975). 
Similarly, Parker "state action" should not be confused with the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, which exempts from the scope of the antitrust laws joint efforts by private parties 
to influence political and policy decisions of public officials. See United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For commentaries on these cases, see Costilo, 
Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 
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any standard for determining whether a particular action involv- 
ing a state sovereign is exempt.33 During the next decade, the 
Court applied Parker quite narrowly to deny state action immun- 
ity to conduct permitted under state regulatory and legislative 
authority." Since the Court did not directly confront the state 
action issue again until 1975,35 the Parker doctrine has been de- 
(1967); Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 418 (1969). In 
distinguishing Parker "state action" from Noerr-Pennington immunity, one court has 
ruled that "[wlhere political considerations are .absent the Noerr doctrine is inapplica- 
ble" since the Noerr-Pennington rule seeks to protect only First Amendment rights to 
petition government officials to influence policy decisions. Woods Exploration & Produc- 
ing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1047 (1972). Another court comparing the two doctrines has ruled that 
[tlhe two are not coterminous. For example, an unsuccessful attempt to influ- 
ence government action may fall within the Noerr-Pennington immunity, but 
not the Parker immunity. Conversely, a state regulatory agency may decide to 
restrain competition without prompting; the beneficiaries, not having solicited 
government action, would enjoy a Parker immunity but not one based on Noerr- 
Pennington. 
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (1st Cir.), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). 
33. Slater, supra note 13, a t  73. Slater reasoned: "It is safe to assume that the 
language of the general exemption in Parker means that some state action is exempt; 
nevertheless, the language of limitation indicates that not all state action is exempt." Id. 
34. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U S .  533 (1944), the 
Court held that the insurance industry was subject to the Sherman Act, despite extensive 
state regulation. Congress responded quickly, however, by enacting the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 15-20, 59 Stat. 34 (codified at  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) 
(1970)), which exempted from federal statutes "any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance," with provision that the Sherman Act and 
other federal statutes would apply to "the extent such business is not regulated by State 
law." Later, in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), the 
Court invalidated a state fair trade statute permitting enforcement of vertical price-fixing 
agreements among private contracting parties against nonsigners. Although Congress had 
earlier passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (codified 
at  15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)), which specifically exempted from the Sherman Act certain price 
maintenance agreements, the Court found the state statute enforcing pricing agreements 
against nonsigners to be beyond the statutory exemption and not within the Parker ex- 
emption. In response to Schwegmann, Congress passed the McGuire Bill of 1952, ch. 745, 
§§ 1, 2, 66 Stat. 632 (codified at  15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2)-(5) (1970)). This bill extended the 
Miller-Tydings exemption to state statutes that enforced price agreements even against 
nonsigners. 
35. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In 1967, William Bach- 
elder, a noted antitrust lawyer, reported to the A.B.A. Committee on Anti-Trust Exemp- 
tions that there was a "dearth of contemporaneous comment" on the holding and rationale 
of the Parker decision. Bachelder, State-Approved Transactions, 33 A.B.A. A N ~ R U S T  L.J. 
99, 101 (1967). He also foresaw the future of the doctrine: 
[A]s the concept of interstate commerce and of the reach of the Sherman Act 
continue to expand, it is significant to note that there is probably a great body 
of public utility and other economic activity directed, encouraged or approved 
by various governmental agencies which operates under the assumed or assured 
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veloped primarily in lower federal courts as increasing numbers 
of antitrust defendants have claimed immunity on the basis of 
some degree of state involvement .36 
1 .  Categorical approach 
Through a literal reading of Parker, lower courts and many 
commentators have generally embraced a categorical approach to 
state action cases.37 Without identifying or balancing competing 
federal-state interests, courts employing this approach assume 
that a certain category of conduct defined as "state action" is per 
se exempt from the antitrust laws or is beyond the jurisdictional 
protection of antitrust exemption such as that recognized and applied in Parker 
v. Brown. 
Id. a t  103. For further commentary see Verkuil, supra note 32, at 331, explaining that 
"[tlhe Parker variety of protected state action suffers from a conceptually amorphous 
content because it has atrophied over the years due to inattention by the Supreme Court 
and indecision by the lower federal courts." 
36. See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 
518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 
1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 
754 (4th Cir. 1973); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 
1972); Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Gas 
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 
(1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 
1971); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock 
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E.W. Wiggins 
Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 363 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 
(1966); Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964); Asheville 
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959); Chastain v. A.T. & T., 
401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Macom Prod. Corp. v. A.T.&T., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. 
Cal. 1973); I.T.T. v. G.T.E., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972); Fleming v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. 
Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969). For additional cases, see Handler, The Current Attack on 
the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1976). 
37. One commentator has written: 
Parker v. Brown may have been a correct decision. But the Parker doctrine has 
been expanded in a way which has little relation to the reasons underlying 
Parker. This seems to have occurred because the courts have looked for inspira- 
tion to a close reading of the language of Parker, a case which disposed of the 
antitrust attack as a side issue, in three pages of the United States Reports, and 
which is too narrow a foundation for the vast body of doctrine which has been 
based on it. A reexamination of the reasons for a state regulatory exemption 
should pave the way for at least some restoration of competition in many areas 
which are not insulated from competition by state regulation. 
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust 
Laws, 49 N.Y .U.L. REV. 693, 739 (1974). 
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reach of the Sherman 
Various standards have been fashioned to determine whether 
particular conduct is within the court-defined category of Parker 
immunity. Some courts require as a necessary, although not al- 
ways sufficient, element of immunity that the entity charged with 
antitrust violation be either created or endowed by the state with 
governmental p~wer.~Wther  courts have based immunity on a 
finding of some defined threshold level of state authorization or 
approval,40 state control or super~is ion,~~ state cornpul~ion,~~ or 
38. Under this view "questions of validity of state regulatory schemes in light of the 
antitrust laws are generally regarded as foreclosed." Posner, supra note 37, a t  695. This . 
approach concludes that "the Sherman Act must be construed to outlaw all anticompeti- 
tive state regulation or none, and that Parker properly chose the latter." Id. a t  695 n.2. 
This approach is further typified by comments such as: "[A]lthough the Court in Parker 
did not fully articulate the quantum of state involvement necessary to constitute pro- 
tected state action, the Parker doctrine should play a per se role in immunizing state 
public utility regulation from antitrust scrutiny." Verkuil, supra note 32, a t  339. Another 
scholar has summarized: 
[Tlhe Parker doctrine applies when a state seeks to implement public policy 
goals which it deems to be more beneficial to its citizens than competition. The 
approach adopted in Parker, however, is not one of balancing the importance 
of the state policy against the injury to competition. A fair reading of the case 
indicates that the Court believes that the Sherman Act, and its policy in favor 
of competition, do not apply to state action taken in pursuit of public policy 
goals, no matter how weak the public goals or how serious the injury to competi- 
tion. 
Slater, supra note 13, a t  91. 
39. See, e.g., E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 
55-56 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 
870, 871-73 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 
298 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Immunity has been granted even though 
proposals have originated privately. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 
F.2d 1135,1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light 
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971). In Georgia Power 
the court reasoned: "Though the rates and practices originated with the regulated utility, 
Georgia Power, the facts make it plain that they emerged from the Commission as prod- 
ucts of the Commission. They are thus immune from the operation of the antitrust laws 
under the Parker exemption." Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). 
40. See Business Aides, lnc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th 
Cir. 1973) (anticompetitive refusal to provide exchange service to competitor upheld when 
occasioned by adherence to approved tariff). But see Macom Prod. Corp. v. A.T.&T., 359 
F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (although approved by state commission, tariff eliminating 
service essential to users of competitor's equipment declared subject to Sherman Act). 
41. See Fleming v. Travelers Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971) (immun- 
ity for private insurance company found where rates filed by the company were effective 
immediately after filing, when subject to supervision of independent state insurance com- 
mission). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969) 
(despite prior approval by state insurance commission, regulation and supervision alone 
did not create immunity). 
42. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text infra. 
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state retention of final decisionmaking power.43 Still others have 
conditioned immunity on a finding that the challenged activity 
was undertaken pursuant to a declared legislative policy to sup- 
plant some area of free competition with r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  
In determining the applicability of Parker to anticompetitive 
provisions of electric utility tariffs, courts have generally granted 
immunity only when the utility's rates and practices were subject 
to "meaningful regulation and supervision by the state" so that 
they were, in effect, the "result of the considered judgment of the 
state regulatory author it^."^^ One lower court, however, has cate- 
gorically stated that regulation by a governmental body of rates 
to be charged by a public utility is a "classic example of the 
Parker u. Brown e ~ e m p t i o n . " ~ ~  In what appears to be the furthest 
extension of Parker,47 immunity was granted to an electric utility 
engaging in anticompetitive practices even though the state regu- 
latory commission had neither made investigations of nor given 
its affirmative approval to the utility's anticompetitive tariff. 
Reasoning that the state commission possessed adequate regula- 
tory power to control the utility if it chose to do so, the court 
justified immunity by inferring that the commission's "silence 
means consent, i.e., approval."48 
2. Federal-state policy balancing approach 
Criticizing the categorical approaches of lower courts, some 
43. See Slater, supra note 13, at 91-95. 
44. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U S .  850 (1970), the court of appeals was convinced by its reading 
of Parker that "valid government action confers antitrust immunity only when govern- 
ment determines that competition is not the summum bonum in a particular field and 
deliberately attempts to provide an alternative form of public regulation." Id. at 30. The 
court then introduced a three-segment analysis to determine when antitrust immunity 
may derive from a state's declared policy towards competition in a particular field. Id.; 
see Slater, supra note 13, at 96-97. 
45. Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 US.  930 (1966). 
46. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1975) (unsuccessful 
attack against allegedly below-cost pricing of telephone rates regulated by state munici- 
pality). 
47. Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011,1018 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(commenting on the decision reached in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & 
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971)). 
48. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th 
Cir. 1971). Under its approved tariff, the electric utility sought advantage over its gas 
competitor by offering substantial rate reductions to new home builders who went "all 
electric." A similar fact situation gave rise to Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 US. 1062 (1972). 
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commentators have interpreted Parker, in light of its underlying 
policies, through a preemption or other balancing approach." 
Preemption is a judicially created doctrine based on the suprem- 
acy clause50 and is designed to resolve conflicts between dual 
sovereigns by giving primacy to federal law.51 Out of respect for 
state sovereigns, however, courts may employ a judicial canon of 
construction providing that neither the general statutory lan- 
guage of the Sherman Act nor the general language of the com- 
merce clause overrides important state  interest^.^^ 
In a preemption-type analysis, the court identifies the fed- 
eral and state interests in a particular area.53 If a conflict exists, 
it determines whether Congress intended the federal policy to be 
exclusive; if so, the inquiry is ended and the state policy is 
voided.54 If it is not intended to be exclusive, the court ascertains 
the substance and scope of the policy intended by Congress and 
determines whether the state program "stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec- 
tives of Congres~."~~ The state policy will be voided to the extent 
that it blocks the effectiveness of the federal p ~ l i c y . ~ V i e w e d  
through preemption analysis, Parker has been interpreted as an 
implicit balancing of federal and state interests?' Since the fed- 
eral antitrust laws were never intended by Congress to be an 
exclusive system of r e g u l a t i ~ n ~ ~  and the state regulatory action 
in Parker aimed at  preserving economic wealth and protecting 
49. See, e.g., First, supra note 12; Posner, supra note 37; Slater, supra note 13; 
Verkuil, supra note 32; Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v.  State Anticompetitive Regula- 
tion: A Means Scrutiny Limit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 179; Note, Parker 
v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Preemption Analysis]. 
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
51. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, a t  1167. 
52. See Yosner, supra note 37, a t  704. 
53. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941). 
54. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). 
55. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
56. The federal antitrust laws promote three general economic policies: to maintain 
allocative efficiency through free competition; to protect consumers by ensuring adequate 
quality a t  a fair price; and to preserve small competitors, both as a noneconomic social 
goal and as a means of approximating the perfect market. See Bork, Bowman, Blake & 
Jones, Goals of  Antitrust-A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 365, 369, 381-83 
(1965). 
57. See Preemption Analysis, supra note 49. 
58. The antitrust laws are an interstitial system rather than a system exclusive of all 
other regulation. H.R. REP. NO. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1890); 21 CONG. REC. 2456 
(1890). 
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small competitors did not block the effectiveness of the federal 
policy, it was not necessary in Parker to invalidate the Prorate 
Act in order to maintain the superior federal antitrust p01icies.~~ 
C. The Goldfarb Refinement of Parker 
In the 1975 case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6o the Su- 
preme Court reexamined the state action immunity doctrine for 
the first time in over two decades. Goldfarb brought suit against 
the state, county, and local bar associations, claiming that mini- 
mum fee schedules established and enforced by the bars consti- 
tuted price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act." Addressing 
the question of whether the Virginia State Bar, a "state agency 
by law,"62 was immune under Parker v. Brown as a state entity, 
the Court stated that "[tlhe fact that the State Bar is a state 
agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust 
shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the 
benefit of its members."63 The county bar, not a state agency but 
a private, voluntary a s s ~ c i a t i o n , ~ ~  claimed immunity on the 
ground that the "ethical codes and activities of the State Bar 
'prompted' it to issue anticompetitive fee  schedule^."^ Rejecting 
this argument, the Court ruled that "[tlhe threshold inquiry in 
determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the 
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the 
activity is required by the State acting as ~overeign."~~ The Court 
further declared that "[ilt is not enough that . . . anticompeti- 
tive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompeti- 
tive activities must be compelled by direction of the State 
. . . ."67 The Court denied Parker immunity to both bars, finding 
that neither had been compelled by the state to engage in price- 
fixing activities? 
59. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, at 1174-75. 
60. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
61. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
62. 421 U.S. a t  789-90. For the statutory language vesting authority in the state bar, 
see id. at  790 n.20. 
63. Id. at 791. 
64. Id. at 790. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 790 (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at  791 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the County Bar's arguments 
for immunity "at most, constitute the contention that their activities complemented the 
objective of the ethical codes. In our view that is not state action for Sherman Act pur- 
poses." Id. 
68. Id. at 790-91. The Goldfarb "~ompelled'~ or "required" threshold standard had 
been hinted at in Parker, 96 S. Ct. 3117 n.24, and had been expressly invoked by the 
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The Supreme Court in the instant case confronted for the 
first time the task of determining the extent to which a state 
utility commission may immunize-without any independent 
regulatory purpose-a privately owned utility's anticompetitive 
conduct in a separate, unregulated, competitive market. A major- 
ity of the Court refused to find state action immunity for Edison's 
anticompetitive lamp exchange program, which had been ap- 
proved by the Commission and which had to be continued while 
the approval remained effective? 
In Part  I of the four-part plurality opinion,'" a majority 
agreed that there was no state legislative policy to supplant free 
competition in the distribution of light bulbs. Since the Commis- 
sion's approval of Edison's decision to maintain an exchange pro- 
gram did not "implement any statewide policy relating to light 
bulbs," the Court inferred that "the State's policy [was] neutral 
on the question whether a utility should, or should not, have such 
a program. 0 7 1  
In Part 11, the plurality concluded that the "only Sherman 
Act issue decided [in Parker] was whether the sovereign State 
itself . . . was . . . subject to its  prohibition^."^^ Since the in- 
stant case did not call into question the legality of any act of 
Michigan or any of its officials or agents, the plurality found that 
the case was not controlled by Parker.73 In a concurring opinion, 
Chief Justice Burger argued that the plurality's narrow reading 
- 
Supreme Court in determining whether immunity existed when foreign government action 
was involved. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 US.  690 
(1962); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298, 
1303 (D. Del. 1970). Subsequent to Goldfarb, the standard has been applied in suits 
involving domestic state action to invalidate an anticompetitive provision of a utility's 
state-approved tariff where the provision was not specifically required by the state regula- 
tory agency. Chastain v. A.T.&T., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975). 
69. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3112 (1976). 
70. Parts 11 and IV of Justice Stevens' plurality opinion were joined only by Justices 
Brennan, White, and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger joined in Parts I and III, and Justice 
Blackmun joined in Part III. Thus, Parts I and 111 represent a majority position of the 
Court. 
71. 96 S. Ct. a t  3114. The dissenters disagreed with the majority conclusion that 
Michigan's policy is "neutral" with respect to whether a utility should have a lamp 
exchange program. Id. a t  3134 n.11. They argued that the broad powers vested in the 
Commission to "hear and pass upon all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident to 
such regulation," MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. Ej 460.6 (Supp. 1976-77), included the power to 
authorize the lamp exchange program. See id. a t  3139 n.26. According to the dissent, a 
decision by the Commission to approve the program is itself an articulation of state policy. 
72. 96 S. Ct. a t  3117. 
73. Id. 
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of Parker was unnecessary to the result in the instant case and 
noted that  Parker immunity should be "focused on the chal- 
lenged activity, not upon the identity of the parties to the suit."74 
A majority agreed in Part 111 that Parker should not be ex- 
tended to cover the instant case.75 The Court conducted a two- 
part to determine if the particular private conduct alleg- 
edly required by state law should be exempt from the Sherman 
Act. First, the Court asked whether it would be unfair to apply 
the federal antitrust laws to a private party who has done nothing 
more than obey the command of his state sovereigm7' Acknowl- 
edging such unfairness when the private party has done nothing 
more than obey a state's command, the Court announced a 
"fairness" standard for deciding cases involving a blend of private 
and public decisionmaking. Where a private party exercises 
"sufficient freedom of choice" or has an "option to have, or not 
to  have" an anticompetitive program and voluntarily chooses the 
anticompetitive practice, it is not unfair to hold i t  responsible for 
the consequences of its decision.78 Next, the Court inquired 
whether Congress intended to superimpose the antitrust laws as 
an additional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism in 
areas of the economy already regulated by a state.79 The Court 
rejected for three reasons Edison's argument that the antitrust 
laws were inapplicable to the lamp exchange program. First, 
there was "no logical inconsistency between requiring Edison to 
meet regulatory criteria insofar as it [was] exercising its natural 
monopoly powers and [requiring] it to comply with antitrust 
standards to the extent that it [engaged] in business activity in 
competitive areas of the economy."80 Second, even if such incon- 
sistency exists, the standards for ascertaining the existence and 
scope of the state action exemption must be a t  least as severe as 
those applied in reconciling inconsistent federal regulatory legis- 
lation with federal antitrust laws.81 Finally, even though Congress 
did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy 
74. Id. at 3123. 
75. See id. at 3121. 
76. The Court did not label its discussion a "two-part inquiry," but rather explored 
"two . . . different reasons" that might support a finding that "private conduct required 
by state law is exempt from the Sherman Act." Id. at 3117. The dissent, however, charac- 
terized the majority's approach as a "new two-part immunity test." Id. at 3133-35. 
77. Id. at 3117. 
78. Id. at 3117-19. 
79. Id. at 3117. 
80. Id. at 3119-20. 
81. Id. at 3120; see notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra. 
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primarily regulated by a state, enforcement of the antitrust laws 
against Edison was not foreclosed in the essentially unregulated 
area of light bulb d i s t r i b u t i ~ n . ~ ~  Chief Justice Burger agreed that 
"[tlo find a 'state action' exemption on the basis of Michigan's 
undifferentiated sanction of this ancillary practice could serve no 
federal or state policy."" 
Concurring in the majority's result, Justice Blackmun pro- 
posed that an equal protection-substantive due process "rule of 
reason" test be applied to determine if the potential harms out- 
weigh the benefits of state sanctioned anticompetitive conduct.g4 
A strong dissent rejected the plurality's narrow interpreta- 
tion of Parker. The three dissenting Justices argued that the 
question whether state action effecting a restraint on trade is 
preempted by the Sherman Act was answered in the negative by 
the Parker decision." They also warned that an application of the 
majority's new immunity test to practices deemed ancillary to the 
state's regulatory goals creates a "statutory simulacrum of the 
substantive due process doctrine"" and "will surely result in dis- 
ruption of the operation of every state-regulated public utility 
company in the N a t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The dissenters cautioned that courts 
cannot go beyond the Goldfarb refinement of Parker "without 
disregarding the purpose of the Sherman Act not to disrupt state 
regulatory laws. "8g 
The Court's decision in the instant case significantly restricts 
the ambit of state action qualifying for Parker immunity and, 
together with Goldfarb, severely limits the broad categorical in- 
terpretations recently given to  Parker by many lower federal 
courts. Of paramount importance is the Court's explicit adoption 
of an analysis suited to identifying and resolving the conflicting 
82. See id. a t  3119. 
83. Id. a t  3124. 
84. See id. a t  3124-28. Justice Blackmun introduced his approach under the rubric 
of "preemption," id. a t  3124, yet his discussion of an "equal protection-type rule of 
reason" approach would take "as a general proposition that state-sanctioned anticompeti- 
tive activity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits" in a 
consideration of the case on its merits. Id. a t  3126. The "fact of state sanction [would] 
figure powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit," which resembles an economic due 
process analysis. Id. 
85. Id a t  3132 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. a t  3140. 
87. Id. a t  3129. 
88. Id. at  3139. 
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policies of dual sovereignties that should underlie application of 
Parker immunity. This case note will evaluate first the plurality's 
narrow interpretation of Parker and then the majority's two-part 
analytical framework for determining the applicability of state 
action immunity to anticompetitive practices of state-regulated 
utilities involving a blend of public and private decisionmaking. 
A. The Plurality's Overly Narrow Interpretation of Parker 
In Part I1 of its opinion, the plurality stated that the only 
Sherman Act holding in Parker was that a sovereign state, pre- 
viously held to be a "person" within the meaning of section 7 of 
the Sherman Act," was not subject to the Act's prohibitions? 
Although the precise Sherman Act issue raised by the Court in 
Parker was phrased in traditional preemption terms,g1 Parker 
may be read in categorical terms in light of the pre-Parker cases 
in which courts resolved conflicts between state regulatory law 
and the Sherman Act by finding that the state official or agent 
acting pursuant to  s ta te  policy was not a "person" or 
"corporation" within the reach of the Sherman Acteg2 Such a 
categorical approach would exempt as state action the conduct 
of a state entity, its officers, or its agents. 
Consistent with this approach, the plurality's narrow inter- 
pretation is arguably supported by certain language in the Parker 
opinion.93 Since there was no claim in Parker, and hence no rul- 
89. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Roberts 
reasoned that "[ilf the word 'person' is to include a State as plaintiff, it must equally 
include a State as a defendant or the language used [in the Act] is meaningless." Id. at 
163. It may be argued that the decision in Parker was a categorical answer to Justice 
Roberts' contention. 
90. 96 S. Ct. a t  3117. The plurality relied heavily upon the briefs submitted to the 
Court in Parker to support its narrow construction of the Parker decision. See id. at 3114- 
17 & nn.16-20. The dissent used the same briefs to refute the plurality, see id. at 3130-32 
& nn.6-8, and correctly noted that, as a general rule, the positions taken in appellate briefs 
should play no role in interpreting the court's written opinions. Id. a t  3130. The dissent 
astutely reasoned that "[a] contrary rule would permit the 'plain meaning' of [court] 
decisions to be qualified or even overridden by their 'legislative history'-i.e., the briefs 
submitted by the contending parties." Id. The conflicting views presented in adversarial 
briefs and oral arguments do not bear a relationship to the Court's final opinion that is 
analogous to the use of legislative history, which emanates from the same source as the 
legislation itself, to discern legislative intent. Id. For the above reasons, this case note will 
not attempt to evaluate the relative merits of the plurality's and dissent's respective 
interpretations of Parker based on briefs submitted to the Court in Parker. 
91. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
92. See generally note 24 supra. 
93. The Parker opinion made numerous references to the fact that "state action," not 
private action, was involved in the proration program. See 317 U.S. at 350-52. The plural- 
9121 CASE NOTES 929 
ing, that any private individual or corporation had violated the 
antitrust laws, the plurality is technically correct in ruling that 
the instant case "is not controlled by the Parker decision."g4 As 
discussed below, however, Parker should not be read so narrowly. 
This narrow construction of Parker is inconsistent with the over- 
all language of the Parker opinion, the post-Parker decisions, and 
a policy oriented preemption-type analysis of the decision. 
A categorical analysis would have been sufficient to dispose 
of Parker,g5 but the Court did not limit its analysis to the issue of 
whether a state is a "person" within the meaning of the Sherman 
Act. It also raised, without deciding, the question of whether a 
state or its municipality, by participating in a private agreement 
or combination by others for restraint of trade, would maintain 
its antitrust immunity.g6 This issue would not arise under a 
strictly categorical approach.g7 Also, since the Parker opinion 
mentioned both "state action" and "official action directed by 
the state," it is probable that the latter refers to action by private 
parties pursuant to the mandate of the state sovereign (such as 
the prorate producers in Parker) as well as to action of a state 
entity. Moreover, the plurality's narrow interpretation "would 
trivialize [Parker] to the point of overruling it,"" as the dissent 
correctly argued. 
If Parker stands for the sole proposition that state entities are 
beyond the reach of the antitrust laws, such categorical immunity 
can be easily circumvented by bringing suit against a private 
party who is implementing the state's anticompetitive com- 
mand? It is obvious that the dual system of federal-state regula- 
tion that Parker serves to safeguard would cease to exist if the 
doctrine failed to protect private parties acting under the com- 
mand of a state decisionmaker. 
ity believes that carefully chosen language in each reference distinguished "official action" 
from individual action, even when commanded by the state. See 96 S. Ct. a t  3117 n.24. 
94. 96 S. Ct. a t  3117. 
95. The Court could have ruled that the state is not a "person" or "corporation" 
suable under the antitrust laws, i.e., that a state official is beyond the jurisdictional reach 
of the antitrust laws. Since Parker was an official of the state, such a jurisdictional ruling 
would have dismissed the complaint brought by Brown. 
96. 317 U.S. a t  351-52. 
97. If a state were not within the Act on jurisdictional grounds as a state entity, the 
fact of joining a private conspiracy should not affect that immunity. See Preemption 
Analysis, supra note 49, at 1173. 
98. 96 S. Ct. a t  3129 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
99. In this posture, Parker would effectively stand only for the trivial proposition that 
Brown should have sued private raisin growers instead of the California Director of Agri- 
culture. See id. a t  3129 n.4. 
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The plurality's narrow categorical interpretation, which lim- 
its immunity to only state entities, would contradict and overrule 
all lower court decisions granting immunity to private, state- 
directed defendants.lM More importantly, this narrow construc- 
tion would overrule the Supreme Court's holding in Goldfarb, 
which focused on the "challenged activity, not upon the identity 
of parties to the suit."lOl The analysis of Goldfarb by Chief Justice 
Burger is clear and persuasive: 
If Parker's holding were limited simply to the nonliability of 
state officials, then the Court's inquiry in Goldfarb as to the 
County Bar Association's claimed exemgtion could have ended 
upon our recognition that the organization was "a voluntary 
association and not a state agency. . . ." Yet, before determin- 
ing that there was no exemption from the antitrust laws, the 
Court proceeded to treat the association's contention that its 
action having been "prompted" by the State Bar, was "state 
action for Sherman Act purposes. "lo* 
Hence, the emphasis in Goldfarb on activities, instead of parties, 
stands in direct opposition to the plurality's narrow interpreta- 
tion. 
The confusion and inconsistency of judicial categorical deci- 
sions may be resolved if Parker is analyzed in preemption 
terms.lo3 When so approached, the deciding factor in Parker was 
not that a state official was named as a defendant, but that the 
Prorate Act, enacted by the state legislature to supplant competi- 
tion in the agricultural industry, was not wholly inconsistent with 
superior federal policies. Thus, Parker did not create blanket 
immunity for all "state action" or "official action directed by the 
state"; rather, recognizing that the federal system contemplates 
states as sovereign within their spheres of authority, the Court 
showed deference to a state anticompetitive program not incom- 
patible with federal law. Clearly, comity need not be shown to all 
state programs, but federal courts should be reluctant to void an 
explicit state policy. This preemption approach to Parker is in- 
consistent with the plurality focus on "parties" but consistent 
with the Goldfarb focus on "activity." Since state law may be 
superseded by the Sherman Act regardless of whether state offi- 
100. See cases involving a private rather than a governmental defendant listed in note 
36 supra. 
101. 96 S. Ct. at 3123 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
102. Id. 
103. Preemption Analysis, supra note 49, at 1173-76. 
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cials are subject to suit for violation of the Act,lo4 it cannot be 
supposed that the Court would have found the Prorate Act any 
less valid had the question been raised in a suit against the pri- 
vate producers implementing the program, instead of against the 
state officials administering and enforcing it. 
B. Two-step Determination of State Action Immunity 
If all state or private conduct involving interstate commerce 
authorized by a state were governed by the federal antitrust laws, 
there would be a drastic restructuring of our entire economic 
system.lo5 Congress clearly did not intend such a result,lo6 and 
Parker expressly held that the Sherman Act did not proscribe all 
state action leading to results which, if privately arranged, would 
offend the federal antitrust laws. In recognizing this major anti- 
trust exemption, however, the Court failed to articulate an ana- 
lytical framework for determining the extent to which state policy 
could undermine the strong federal antitrust policy. In subse- 
quent cases the Court merely indicated that some state action 
was not immune;lo7 and, while Goldfarb articulated a threshold 
inquiry,lo8 it did not establish an analytical approach for deter- 
mining state action cases once the threshold is passed. 
The two-part analytical framework used by the Court in the 
instant case provides the flexibility necessary to decide each state 
action case on its peculiar factslog and, at the same time, achieve 
consistent results. First, a court must decide whether it would be 
unfair to apply the federal antitrust laws to private anticompeti- 
tive conduct undertaken in response to the command of a state 
sovereign by considering whether the private party has exercised 
a "sufficient freedom of choice" in the matter. Second, the court 
104. 96 S. Ct. at 3131 & n.7. 
105. See Slater, supra note 13, a t  75. Despite the rather wide construction of the 
Parker doctrine over the last decade, the Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, 
Department of Justice, warned in 1970 that "much anticompetitive state law and anti- 
competitive activity claimed to be protected thereby in fact violate federal antitrust law 
. . . the alleged state law being ineffective to confer immunity. Donnem, Federal Anti- 
trust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. J. 950, 957 
(1970). He also foresaw the decision in the instant case by declaring that "if a state law 
were contrary to the Sherman Act . . . the state law would be invalid under the Suprem- 
acy Clause of the Constitution." Id. a t  958. 
106. See Handler, supra note 10, a t  7. 
107. See note 34 supra. 
108. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. 
109. Since industries regulated by state law vary greatly in the rationale, administra- 
tion, and intensity of their regulation, a categorical rulemaking approach would not be 
an acceptable solution. 
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must consider whether Congress intended to superimpose anti- 
trust standards on conduct already being regulated by a state. 
1.  The fairness standard 
The unwillingness of lower courts to apply federal antitrust 
laws to state influenced private conduct has been predicated 
chiefly upon the perceived unfairness of imposing treble damages 
against practices approved, required, or tightly supervised by 
state legislative or regulatory authority.l1° The plurality's discus- 
sion of unfairness presupposes the possibility of awarding treble 
damages in state action cases. The Court justifies such imposition 
by assuming that unfairness would result only if (1) "the hazard 
of violating the antitrust laws were enhanced by the fact of regu- 
lation" or (2) a "regulated [industry] had engaged in anticompe- 
titive conduct in reliance on a justified understanding that such 
conduct was immune from the antitrust laws."111 
In the instant case the hazard of violating the antitrust laws 
flowed from Edison's tariff, which was a product of Edison's busi- 
ness judgment and private decisionmaking, not of a mandatory 
order by the Commission to comply with the tariff. The Commis- 
sion neither initiated the lamp exchange program nor recom- 
110. The problems surrounding imposition of treble damages in state action cases is 
discussed in Posner, supra note 37, a t  729-31: 
It is not unlikely that the prospect of damages and the absence of any mitigating 
doctrine has had an  inhibiting effect on efforts to curtail the reach of Par- 
ker. . . . 
A privilege should be developed against damage liability for good faith 
actions of private firms in securing or operating under state regulation. "Good 
faith" would relate to the existence and reasonableness of a belief that the state 
regulation was not invalid . . . . 
The policy justifications for developing such a privilege are twofold: 
First the line between valid and invalid regulation, whether permissive or man- 
datory in form, is not always a clear one. . . . If a prospective defendant must 
bear the entire risk of invalidity, he is likely to be reluctant to comply with, or 
avail himself of, state regulation even when it is valid. . . . 
Thus, a privilege for good-faith reliance on invalid state regulation is desir- 
able, in order to encourage individuals to rely on valid state regulation. . . . 
The second policy justification to support the privilege proposed . . . is 
unfairness to defendants subject to conflicting statutory commands. 
Id. Another scholar has cautioned that "antitrust treble damage action is an inappropriate 
vehicle for regulating public utilities." Verkuil, supra note 32, a t  339. He argues that 
"[tlreble damage actions tend to introduce irrationality" into the system of state public 
utility regulation and "may contradict the assumption underlying the need for regulation 
in the first place." Id. 
If the antitrust laws were enforced only prospectively against state regulated indus- 
tries through injunction, there would never be a serious question of unfairness. 
111. 96 S. Ct. a t  3121. 
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mended its continuance.l12 Although the Commission's approval 
of the tariff may have provided an arguable defense against 
charges of antitrust violation, such approval could not logically 
have increased 
The Court 
any other state 
Edison's risk of violating the antitrust laws. 
found no facts showing that the Commission or 
agency led Edison to believe that its conduct was 
exempt from the antitrust laws.l13 Even assuming the Commis- 
sion had issued such assurances or guarantees, Parker warned 
that "a state cannot give immunity to those who violate the Sher- 
man Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that  
their action is lawful."l14 The Court characterized state action 
immunity as an affirmative defense to conduct that is otherwise 
assumed to be unlawful.115 Therefore, it is likely that a party 
raising this defense has engaged in conduct that, without the 
involvement of the state, would be unlawful. 
Under the system of federalism, there is no justification for 
treating state-involved private anticompetitive conduct differ- 
ently from other private practices violative of the antitrust laws, 
except where a "sufficiently significant"lls nexus exists between 
the private conduct and the state policy.l17 For cases involving a 
blend of private and public decisionmaking, the Court in the 
instant case articulated the threshold level of private decision- 
making that is requisite to a finding of immunity. 
112. Concerned primarily with the reasonableness of utility rates in relation to elec- 
trical services supplied, the Commission considered the exchange program only with re- 
gard to the light bulb expenditures included in Edison's service rate cost analysis. The 
district court found that the rate schedules were derived after Edison "furnished the Com- 
mission with data including information on the free [light] bulb exchange program." 392 
F. Supp. at 1112. Yet, Cantor's uncontradicted argument on appeal was that "the only 
data to which Judge Feikens could be referring is a two line entry of bulb costs supplied 
in pencilled work sheets which Edison made available to [Commission] auditors in 1972 
which Edison's rate making officer admitted were part of voluminous documents." Brief 
for Petitioner, supra note 1, a t  10. 
113. Edison probably relied upon 90 years of uninterrupted Commission approval. It 
is likely that if Edison had considered any antitrust implications of its lamp exchange 
service, it may have relied on the generally expanded interpretation of the Parker doctrine, 
which treated rate making activities of public utilities as per se exempt from the antitrust 
laws. See notes 37-38, 46-48 and accompanying text supra. 
114. 317 U.S. a t  351. 
115. 96 S. Ct. at 3121. 
116. The Court used the conclusory "sufficiently significant" phrase in declaring that 
"[tlhere is nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's participation in the decision 
is sufficiently significant to require that its conduct implementing the decision, like com- 
parable conduct by unregulated businesses, conform to applicable federal law." 96 S. Ct. 
a t  3119. 
117. It would serve neither the state interest in economic regulation nor the federal 
interest in maintaining free competition and dispersed economic power to allow mere state 
participation to exempt private conduct. See id. at 3123-24. 
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Although the threshold inquiry in the instant case is couched 
in "fairness" language, this touchstone is merely an alternative 
linguistic form of the Goldfarb "required" or "compelled" thresh- 
old inquiry? The "fairness" standard, phrased in terms of 
"sufficient freedom of choice" or "option to have, or not to 
have," restates the "required" or "compelled" standard by ap- 
proaching the same threshold inquiry from the opposite direc- 
tion.llg Both approaches attempt to delineate that degree of state 
participation necessary to sustain a claim of immunity, but here 
the restatement is much stricter than that of Goldfarb.lZ0 In 
Goldfarb the Court considered only the voluntary, unilateral de- 
cision of the state and county bar associations to engage in price- 
fixing.lZ1 The instant case, however, presented a complex blend 
of private, voluntary decisionmaking and state-enforced, manda- 
tory compliance with decisions reached. 
Prompted by the facts of the instant case, the Court chose 
to refine the Goldfarb standard. Judged by the Goldfarb standard 
alone, Edison's lamp exchange program would likely be immune 
from antitrust attack as an activity "required" or "compelled" by 
state order. Now, despite an accompanying state requirement to 
adhere to one's private decision, when one freely elects to engage 
in anticompetitive activity the Court will not likely grant an ex- 
emption. This clarification shifts the focus of inquiry from the 
decisionmaking action of the state to the decisionmaking freedom 
of the private party. In the absence of a definite state policy 
against competition in some area of the economy, this redirected 
emphasis will prevent further extension of the state action ex- 
emption to private anticompetitive conduct that "masquerades 
behind self-created imprimaturs of state approval."1z2 Since the 
federal antitrust laws should defer only to the economic policy 
decisions of state sovereignties-as opposed to private business 
judgments-it is not unfair to provide that a party exercising the 
"option to have, or not to have" an anticompetitive program 
engages in such practices at his own peril. 
118. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. 
119. Whereas Goldfarb focused on the degree of state involvement to determine 
whether the state "compelled" or "required" the activity, the instant case focused on the 
degree of private involvment to determine whether private decisionmaking was su- 
perseded by state mandate. 
120. The plurality noted that the Goldfarb standard would arguably "allow every 
state agency to grant . . . immunity by merely including a direction to engage in the 
proposed conduct in an approval order." 96 S. Ct. at 3123. 
121. In Goldfarb, the state neither approved the price-fixing nor required the bars to 
comply with their own price schedules. 421 U.S. at 789-92. 
122. Verkuil, supra note 32, at 357-58. 
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In applying the new "fairness" standard, unfair results can 
be avoided where a private party is forced to choose between two 
conflicting laws.lZ3 If a party has no choice, but is compelled by 
the state to engage in anticompetitive conduct, any violation 
flowing therefrom should be deemed state action and liability 
should not attach to the private party.lZ4 By limiting the scope of 
exemption to cases in which private discretion or business judg- 
ment is superseded by state mandate, and by making private 
parties responsible for their own anticompetitive choices, the 
objectives of the antitrust laws to promote allocative efficiency 
and protect against a concentration of private economic power 
will not be smothered under the proliferation of state regulatory 
schemes. 
2. Balancing of federal and state interests 
Although a finding of "sufficient freedom of choice" on the 
part of Edison would have disposed of the case, the Court further 
explored the state action defense to consider how conflicts be- 
tween federal and state interests should be resolved in state ac- 
tion exemption cases. The Court's preemption-type analysis is 
premised on the belief that Parker reflected not only a valid legal 
conclusion but a proper determination of policy as well. The 
"state action" policy issue is whether Congress intended to super- 
impose the antitrust laws as an additional, and perhaps conflict- 
ing, regulatory mechanism in areas of the economy predomi- 
nantly within the scope of state regulation. In Goldfarb, the Court 
did not go beyond the "required" or "compelled" threshold in- 
quiry. Lower courts have generally ignored the need to balance 
state and federal interests by reasoning that activity that meets 
the threshold test is per se immune.lZ5 Thus, perhaps the greatest 
contribution of the instant case will be its exposition and explora- 
tion of the policies underlying Parker that should be considered 
in applying the state action immunity concept. 
In Part I, the plurality laid the foundation for a preemption- 
type analysislZ6 by identifying the incandescent light bulb market 
123. The majority realized that "there may be cases in which the State's participa- 
tion in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible 
for his conduct implementing it . . . ." 96 S. Ct. at 3119. 
124. See VAN CISE, supm note 13, at 84-85. 
125. See Verkuil, supra note 32, at 357-58; Handler, supra note 10, at 16; note 37 
supra. 
126. The Court advanced three reasons for rejecting the argument that the antitrust 
laws were inapplicable in the area of light bulb distribution. See 96 S.  Ct. at 3119; notes 
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as the economic area affected by Edison's challenged activity. 
This program was carefully distinguished from Edison's unchal- 
lenged activities in furtherance of its more traditional electric 
utility services? Declaring that the state's policy was neutral on 
the question of light bulb distribution, the Court found no reason 
grounded on concepts of federalism or dual sovereignty not to 
apply the antitrust laws to Edison the same as to any other party 
engaging in anticompetitive conduct in an unregulated field. In 
the absence of a state policy, there was no federal-state conflict; 
thus, the preemption analysis was essentially concluded. 
In terms of preemption or balancing of federal-state inter- 
ests, the instant case was a relatively easy case to decide. More 
difficult issues arise, however, when a state policy is articulated 
and must be reconciled with competing federal p01icies.l~~ In the 
instant case the Court announced that, in resolving actual 
federal-state interest conflicts, the standards for ascertaining the 
applicability of state action immunity must be a t  least as severe 
as those applied to determine implied federal  exemption^.'^^ The 
adoption by the Court of the federal exemption standardlM in- 
volving a balancing of competing policies generally rejects the 
categorical approach prevailing prior to the instant case, which 
regarded as foreclosed any inquiry into the validity or pervasive- 
ness of state regulatory schemes.131 Applied to the facts of the 
79-82 and accompanying .text supra. The first and third reasons are both elements of a 
preemption-type analysis. 
127. 96 S. Ct. a t  3113-14. 
128. Parker and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384 (1951), 
presented situations involving a definite state poiicy inconsistent with the federal anti- 
trust laws. The legislative policy in Parker was to supplant free competition in the market- 
ing of raisins with collective marketing and other anticompetitive practices. In 
Schwegmann, the state legislative enactment clearly allowed for enforcement of resale 
price-fixing agreements against nonsigners, thus implying the state's policy of allowing 
this anticompetitive practice. 
129. 96 S. Ct. a t  3120. 
130. The Court in the instant case has either adopted the federal implied exemption 
standard for use in state action cases or merely used it by analogy to defeat Edison's claim 
of per se immunity as a state-regulated public utility. Whether the Court has explicitly 
adopted the same standards is not crucial, for the importance of the instant case is the 
overt decision by the majority to give maximum weight to antitrust policies in state action 
cases through a preemption or other balancing-of-interests analysis. 
131. See note 37 supra. The dissent argues that the majority approach will resurrect 
the once discarded doctrine of economic due process. See 96 S. Ct. a t  3139-41. Although 
reaching perhaps the same results as economic due process analysis, the preemption-type 
approach of the instant case does not require the courts to substitute their own policy 
judgment for those of the state by scrutinizing either the ends or the means of a state 
regulatory policy. Assuming that a clearly defined state policy had been articulated, the 
application of the supremacy clause would merely give primacy to federal policy when it 
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instant case, the federal exemption standard would not result in 
a finding of state action exemption for Edison's lamp exchange 
program.13* Following this decision, courts deciding state action 
cases should favor the federal antitrust policies, both in deciding 
the weight to be given to antitrust laws and in determining 
whether the effect of the regulatory action is to suspend the oper- 
ation of the antitrust laws. 
In contrast with the wide expansion of the Parker doctrine 
by many lower courts, the preemption-type analysis of the instant 
case may restore competition to some areas of the economy pre- 
viously insulated from competition by state regulation.lS3 This 
restoration is critical since the policy reasons for exempting pub- 
lic utilities or natural monopolies from the antitrust laws are 
meaningless when maintenance of the monopoly ceases to be in- 
evitable or power in the monopoly area radiates outward into 
areas where competition is both possible and desirable.ls4 Al- 
though a preemption-type approach using a federal exemption 
standard may inhibit the discretion of state legislators or regula- 
tory agents, it is a result that seems "compelled by the existence 
of a fairly well-defined federal antitrust policy and the supremacy 
clause. 
- - 
is confronted by inconsistent state policy. If Congress does not agree with the Court's 
application of the antitrust laws to areas of the economy that are "ancillary" to the 
traditionally exempt rate making practices of public utilities, i t  may create an express 
exemption as it has done in the past. See note 34 supra. The fact that Congress granted 
exemptions after courts refused to create such exemptions "does not indicate that the 
Court's decisions were erroneous, but merely that the Court had successfully placed the 
responsibility on Congress to decide whether to replace competition with a system of 
public control. It is certainly arguable that Congress is the proper and better equipped 
forum for such lawmaking." First, supra note 12, at 31. 
132. There is no "plain repugnancy" between Michigan's regulatory scheme and the 
federal antitrust laws. 96 S. Ct. a t  3120. Nor is the lamp supply program "imperative in 
the continued effective functioning of Michigan's regulation of the utilities industry." Id. 
a t  3120 n.36. The Court concluded that "[rlegardless of the outcome of this case, Michi- 
gan's interest in regulating its utilities' distribution of electricity will be almost entirely 
unimpaired." Id. a t  3120. 
133. Compare Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 
(4th Cir. 1973) (decided prior to Cantor), with Litton Syss., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976) (relying upon Cantor). 
134. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 106 (2d ed. 1974). 
135. Slater, supra note 13, at 105. 
